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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The crash of tech stocks in the late 1990s, the big 
UK’s overhaul of Corporate Governance in 2003, the 
proliferation of corporate scandals in the last couple 
decades and the global financial crisis in 2008 have 
made corporate governance an attractive field for 
professionals, regulators practitioners and 
academics (Lazarri et al., 2001; The McKinsey 
Quarterly, 2007; Bartram & Bodnar, 2009). These 
events do not seem to find an end, as even with the 
increased publicity and the constant update of the 
corporate governance codes globally, serious 
corporate scandals continue to emerge. Some 
relatively recent – from the many examples – include 
Turing Pharmaceuticals in the US, VW in Germany, 
and Toshiba in Japan. In most of these cases, it is 
the mismanagement and inefficiency in monitoring 
procedures that has resulted in significant financial 
losses (Clarke, 2005; Parker, 2005; Petra, 2005).  
It has been widely accepted that the board of 
directors is the most important element in the 
corporate governance agenda. The main duty of the 
board is to monitor self-interested behaviours of 
executives and to fulfil stakeholders’ expectations 
(Daily et al., 2003; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Brandes 
et al., 2015; Boivie et al., 2016). Boards can be 
described as the “apex of the firm’s decision control 
system” (Fama & Jensen, 1983), which plays a key 
role in monitoring and controlling managers (Dalton 
et al., 1998). The board exists primarily in order to 
hire, fire, monitor, compensate management and 
vote on important decisions in an effort to maximise 
the value of shareholder (Becht et al., 2003; Denis & 
McConnell, 2003; Fistenberg & Malkier, 1994; 
Salmon, 1993; Westphal & Zajac, 2013). According to 
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Iskander and Chambrou (2000), the board of 
directors is the centre of the internal system of 
corporate governance and, in this scope, it has the 
responsibility to assure the long-term viability of the 
firm and to provide oversight of management. 
Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) assert that the boards 
have the fiduciary duty of monitoring management 
performance and protecting shareholders’ interests. 
Boards have a range of roles and responsibilities 
such as the institutional role, strategy role, 
disciplinary role, figurehead role, ethical role, 
auditing role, class hegemony role (Hung, 1998; 
Zahra & Pearce, 1989). In this paper, it is being 
suggested that certain demographic characteristics 
of the organisation can affect the board 
configuration, as they may indicate different needs. 
For example, it is argued that the longer an 
organisation is listed in a stock exchange the higher 
the pressure for the independence of the chairman 
as various corporate governance codes recommend.  
In Greece, Corporate Governance is a topic of 
increasing interest, as a result of dysfunctional 
boards, executive misconduct, the 1999 Athens 
Stock Exchange crisis and international pressures for 
a more market based/ shareholder-oriented model 
of governance. From 1997 to 2000 Greece strived to 
fulfil the “Maastricht Criteria”, in order to be able to 
join the Eurozone. In the period from 1997 to 1999, 
the Athens Stock Exchange (ATHEX) had a high 
growth. However, during the third quarter of 1999 
the market experienced losses, accounting for nearly 
70% of “Peak Value” (ATHEX Annual Report, 2001). 
Consequently, the Hellenic Capital Market 
Commission (HCMC) and the ATHEX enforced rules 
& regulations to protect investors, guarantee the 
operation and liquidity of the market and enhance 
trading (Mertzanis, 2001). In 1999 the Committee on 
Corporate Governance published the “Principles of 
Corporate Governance in Greece” dealing with: 
“rights” & “obligations” of shareholders, “equitable” 
treatment of shareholders, shareholders’ role in 
corporate governance, transparency, disclosure and 
auditing of information, the “make up” of the board 
of directors, and executive management (Committee 
on Corporate Governance in Greece, 1999). The main 
aim was to forsake similar events from occurring in 
the future. At the same time, similar reforms have 
taken place worldwide; lawmakers took action in 
order to exert pressure on companies to reform 
corporate boards’ “structure & processes” which 
resulted in demonstrating sound corporate 
governance policies and practices. 
This paper is based on a sample of 140 
manufacturing firms listed in the ATHEX and 
explores the relationship between organisational 
demographics and board characteristics. More 
specifically the study captures three organisational 
demographics, which are the organisational age, the 
organisational size, and the number of years that 
companies have been listed in the ATHEX. The 
hypotheses of the paper are based on the 
assumption that these organisational characteristics 
can determine the size of the board as well as the 
leadership structure and independence. Specifically, 
the findings examine the organisational 
characteristics influence on board size, board 
leadership structure (duality), and CEO dependence 
or independence. Finally, recommendations for 
future research are made. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Corporate Governance refers to the “integrated set 
of internal and external controls” (Baysinger & 
Hoskison, 1990) and deals with issues like: board 
size, leadership structure, and CEO dependence and 
independence, assuming that boards influence the 
strategic direction and performance of the 
corporations they govern (Beekun, Stedham & 
Young, 1998). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) view 
corporate governance as “the ways in which 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return of investment” 
emphasizing economic return, security and control. 
Donaldson (1990) describes it as a “structure 
whereby managers at the organisation apex are 
controlled through the board of directors, its 
associated structures, executive initiative, and other 
schemes of monitoring and bonding” thereby 
narrowing the “scope” and “structure” of the board 
of directors. In contrast, Kaplan and Norton (2000) 
focus on “stakeholder participation”, defining 
corporate governance as “the connection between 
directors, managers, employees, shareholders; 
customers, creditors and suppliers to the 
corporation and to one another” involving more 
“interest groups”.  
For this study, we propose a model (Figure 1) 
seeking to examine the impact that organisational 
demographic characteristics (age, size, number of 
years listed in the Stock Exchange) have on board 
characteristics (size, leadership structure, CEO 
dependence/independence). The conceptual 
development and theoretical relationships are 
discussed in subsequent paragraphs. 
A plethora of studies argues that board 
characteristics can affect board and organisational 
performance (Koufopoulos et al., 2009; Brown, 2005; 
Upadhyay & Sriram, 2011). However, a limited 
number of studies (e.g. Koufopoulos et al., 2013) 
have investigated the relationship between board 
characteristics and organisational demographics.  
 
Figure 1. Theoretical model 
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Board Characteristics refer to the formal 
structure of the board of directors and its major 
dimensions are board size, board leadership 
structure and CEO dependence/independence.  
Board Size is an element of board structure 
(Daily & Dalton, 1992); it can range from very small 
(5) to very large (30 plus) (Chaganti, Mahajan & 
Sharma, 1985). Studies over the past 50 years found 
the average size is from 12 to 14 members 
(Conference Board, 1962, 1967; Gordon, 1945). As 
board size increases, “expertise” and “critical 
resources” of a firm (Pfeffer, 1973; Larmou & Vafeas, 
2010) as well as company performance (Singh, 2017) 
are enhanced. Larger boards prevent the CEO from 
taking actions against shareholders’ interests (Singh 
& Harianto, 1989). However, increased board size 
hinders initiative & strategic actions (Goodstein, 
Gauten & Boeker, 1994) while unproductive 
interactions may develop as well (O’Reilly, Caldwell 
& Barnett, 1989).  
On the contrary, a smaller board has the ability 
to adapt and exercise a controlling role (Chaganti, 
Mahajan & Sharma, 1985), while a smaller group size 
allows for increased participation and social 
cohesion (Muth & Donaldson, 1998) and due to that 
it increases board’s performance (Koufopoulos et al., 
2008a; Nguyen et al., 2016).  
Leadership Structure – CEO Duality: Another 
important issue is “CEO duality”, which occurs when 
the same individual holds both the CEO and 
Chairperson’s positions in a corporation (Rechner & 
Dalton, 1991). There are previous studies (Weir & 
Laing, 2001) that have identified the Chairpersons’ 
capabilities, including time to devote to running the 
board; knowledge of the industry and willingness to 
play a behind-the-scenes role. The Chairperson 
should also ensure that the directors have all the 
information needed and that there is an effective 
communication with shareholders. Finally, it 
arranges a regular evaluation of the board and its 
members, committees and manages the relations 
between the executive and non-executive directors.  
On the other hand, CEOs are responsible for 
the “day-to-day” management of the company, 
including the implementation of board decisions. 
Serving as a Chairperson may not allow the CEO to 
perform his/her original role that is being highly 
demanding, although Krause et al. (2014) suggest 
that the debate is far more complex than viewing it 
dichotomously. While an individual is serving as CEO 
and Chairperson at the same time, he/she has 
greater stature and influence among board members 
(Harrison, Torres & Kukalis, 1988) but hampers the 
board’s “monitoring” capacity (Beatty & Zajac, 1994).  
Agency theorists support a separation of 
jobs/roles of CEO and Chairperson. As they claim, 
performance will be improved when the board can 
better monitor the CEO (Harris & Helfat, 1998; 
Krause et al., 2014; Aktas et al., 2018; Broye, 2017). 
They also state that if a company combines the 
above roles much power is concentrated to one 
individual who is able to make decisions that do not 
maximise stakeholders’ wealth (Higgs Review, 2003; 
Mallete & Fowell, 1992; Bliss, 2011). This separation 
of CEO and Chairperson’s roles is considered a 
condition for avoiding a “conflict of interest” 
between “corporate constituencies” and 
“management”, and due to that, it improves the 
boards’ ability to govern (OECD, 2004). 
Chairperson’s Dependence/Independence: 
While, there is a tendency towards the separation of 
CEO and Chairperson, based on a need for 
“independence” between management and board, 
there is no considerable empirical research that 
examines the extent to which a separate board 
structure provides the needed “independence”. Even 
when a separate leadership structure is adopted, the 
affiliation between the CEO and Chairperson may 
result in a dysfunctional board. Chairpersons who 
are influenced by the CEO vis-à-vis personal, 
professional, and/or economic relationships may be 
less effective in monitoring management 
(Bainbridge, 1993; Daily & Dalton, 1994a; 
Gabrielsson & Huse, M., 2005, Bezemer et al., 2012).  
As noted, research has neglected the issue of 
Chairpersons’ and CEOs’ dependence/independence. 
Most research conducted pays attention to the 
“independence” versus “dependence” of a board to 
the CEO. Agency theory advocates that affiliated 
directors protect/enhance their business 
relationship with the firm; subsequently, are less 
objective monitors of management than 
independent directors (Anderson & Reeb, 2004) as 
“affiliate” directors develop a “conflict of interests” 
(Dalton et al., 1998). Although, as argued by Krause 
(2016) and Koskinen (2015) further empirical 
research is needed to examine the extent to which 
separating the positions of Chairperson/CEO is more 
effective than a joint Chairperson/CEO, empirical 
findings demonstrate that having 
“outside”/“independent” directors on the board 
improves firm’s performance (Barnhart, Marr & 
Rosenstein, 1994; Daily & Dalton, 1992; Daily & 
Dalton, 1997; McNulty et al., 2011). 
However, Stewardship theory suggests that a 
separate but “affiliated” board structure tends to 
develop trust, empowerment, and provide ease of 
communication all of which are needed for effective 
functioning. Therefore, “affiliated” directors or 
Chairpersons may feel more “aligned” with future 
performance (Muth & Donaldson, 1998; Liu et al., 
2011). 
Determinants of the Board Structure: In our 
study, the organisational characteristics examined 
are: organisational age, organisational size, and the 
number of years that each company is listed in the 
Athens Stock Exchange (ATHEX), which can be some 
of the board determinants that have been 
overlooked in studies of corporate governance. 
Organisational Age is the number of years that 
an organisation exists (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992). 
From the “adaptive system” perspective, age is an 
indicator of accumulated knowledge & experience 
(Carroll & Harrison, 1998; Glance et al., 1997; Lant & 
Mezias, 1992; Lin & Hui, 1999). Lin and Li (2004) 
have classified organisations according to “age” 
using two categories: young and mature. Neubaum 
et al. (2004) and Zahra (1996) classified “young” 
firms those that have been incorporated for eight 
years or less and as “mature” those that exist for 
nine or more years.  
The “Institutional theory of action”, states that 
reliance on rules increases as an organisation ages 
(Zhou, 1993). This increase results from pressures 
for “internal consistency” and “homogeneity” 
amongst members’ (Aldrich, 1972). Additionally, an 
organisation’s mission and purpose are linked with 
its rules and norms (Ocasio, 1999). All the above 
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arguments support that rules and procedures 
increase, as an organisation ages.  
Some scholars (Baum, 1996; Boeker, 1989; 
Zajac & Kraatz, 1993) argue that organisational age 
can affect the ability to implement “strategic 
change” either positively or negatively. For, “mature 
organisations” are likely to resist change because 
their history creates a “barrier” (Nelson & Winter, 
1982; Hannan & Freeman, 1984). Older organisations 
are more committed to their “routines” (Levitt & 
March, 1988) and have “formalised internal 
relationships” (Stinchcombe, 1965). Additionally, 
organisational age and a subsequent “resistance to 
change” may cause “strategic inertia” (Ginsberg & 
Buchholtz, 1990).  
Furthermore, organisational age is associated 
with a firm’s ability to innovate. Innovation is 
governed by organisational routines and search 
strategies (Nelson & Winter, 1982). The firm’s ability 
to innovate depends greatly on the ways knowledge 
is communicated and distributed within it (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1989; 1990). Therefore, if age creates 
increased firmness in communication, older 
organisations may be less innovative. Furthermore, 
other scholars argue that organisational 
competencies are improved with time and that older 
firms are more efficient than younger ones, because 
of greater production experience, better 
relationships with vendors and customers (Ang et 
al., 1999) and therefore, have enhanced 
performance. 
Moreover, Stinchcombe (1965) argues that 
newly established firms have higher propensity to 
die because they suffer in several structural fronts, 
as a result of a lack of know-how and understanding 
of “processes” and “structures”, leading to higher 
failure rates among young firm (Bruderl & Schussler, 
1990; Henderson, 1999).  
Since, organisational age is associated with 
established procedures and structures; we assume 
that it will be related to board’s size and leadership 
structure. Thus, the following propositions were 
formulated:  
Proposition 1a: Organisational age is positively 
associated with a board’s size. 
Proposition 1b: Older organisations tend to have 
separate leadership positions. 
Proposition 1c: Older organisations tend to have 
independent CEOs and Chairpersons.  
Organisational Size: indicates the number of 
organisational members, usually employees (Glisson 
& Martin, 1980), and reflects “resources” available 
(Weiner & Mahoney, 1981); which influences the 
amount of economic activity the firm can engage in. 
It is expected that larger firms are engaged in higher 
volume of activities and activities that are more 
diverse; such as operating in different product and 
geographical markets, engaging in more M&A 
activity, using more sophisticated financial and 
marketing techniques etc. “Agency” perspective 
supports that, larger firms require a greater number 
of directors to monitor and control a firm’s activities 
(Kiel & Nicholson, 2005). Similarly, “Resource 
dependency” theory suggests that while there is a 
need for “environmental linkage”, the firm’s size 
increases (Allen, 1974; Dooley, 1969). Larger 
organisations require access to more resources; in 
order to attain them, they appoint more directors, 
who provide access to necessary resources (Kiel & 
Nicholson, 2005). Empirical findings concerning 
small to medium firms have shown that small firms 
(approximately 30 employees) have boards 
composed of “single-owner” managers or small 
teams, compared to large firms (approximately 100 
employees) who employ larger boards (Bennett & 
Robson, 2004). This positive relationship of 
organizational size with board size is also supported 
by the results of Denis and Sarin (1999) and 
Yermack (1996). 
Moreover, based on resource dependence 
perspective (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003) it is expected 
that as board size increases, the ability of the board 
to provide resources would increase too, by adding 
up each member’s human and social capital. Pfeffer 
and Salancik (1978) suggest that board size would 
depend on the needs of the organisation for access 
to resources and that the greater the needs, the 
larger the size. Therefore, it is expected that a 
greater number of directors will lead to increased 
supply of resources, which may be the need in larger 
organisations.  
In addition, Boone et al. (2007) argue that 
boards of larger firms usually have a greater need to 
increase their board size, as such tasks as 
succession planning, compensation and auditing are 
assigned to board committees rather than handled 
by the board as a whole. These committees are 
usually run by a significant number of outside 
directors, which also indicates the need for greater 
independence of the board in order to provide 
effective monitoring to the management. 
Organisational size is also expected to impact 
board structure. Firstly, it is suggested that as the 
size of the organisation increases, there is a need for 
additional board members, supported in the 
findings of Ali (2018) who found that this 
relationship is stronger in manufacturing firms. 
Moreover, it is argued (Lehn et al., 2009) that larger 
firms require more outside directors because their 
large size increases the potential agency problems. 
Thus, as this risk of agency problems increases, 
apart from the need for more outside directors, 
separation and independence of the Chairperson to 
the CEO is strongly suggested (Krause et al., 2014; 
Lublin, 2012) even though there is also opposite 
evidence found by Linck et al. (2008).  
Consequently, the followings propositions are 
formed: 
Proposition 2a: Organisational size is positively 
related to board size.  
Proposition 2b: Larger organisations tend to 
have separate CEOs and Chairpersons. 
Proposition 2c: Larger organisations tend to 
have independent CEOs and Chairpersons. 
Number of Years listed in the Stock Exchange: 
Quoted companies are required to disclose their 
annual reports, which include the capital structure, 
turnover, profit or loss, total assets, net assets, 
liabilities (long-term and current), their financial 
statements and any other important information 
(Chen, 2001). 
To ensure shareholders interests’, listed 
companies appoint non-executive directors 
(Westhead, 1999). For instance, companies in the 
London Stock Exchange have at least three “non-
executive” directors in the board (Kesner & Dalton, 
1994), while Greek Law No. 3016/2002 implies that 
non-executive directors should account for at least 
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one-third of the board, with minimum two 
independent members. However, according to the 
law representatives of the minority shareholders can 
replace the independent members. Additionally, the 
law establishes rules and regulations regarding: 
obligations of the board, internal control 
mechanisms, transparency, and disclosure. 
Moreover, empirical research suggests that the 
length of the period a corporation is listed in a Stock 
Exchange can affect its internal governance 
mechanisms and performance (Ritter, 1984; 
Aggarwal, Leal & Hernandez, 1993; Levis, 1993; 
Loughran & Ritter, 1995). Listed companies have 
more structured boards, more frequent meetings, 
and provide financial information to the public so as 
to carry out board functions and fulfil legal 
responsibilities (Demb & Neubauer, 1992). In listed 
companies, boards have more formal channels of 
communication, which increases the external 
attention on corporate governance and more proper 
and transparent processes for selecting and 
dismissing CEOs (Long, Dulewicz & Gay, 2005). Firms 
attempting to ferment their place in a stock 
exchange are establishing larger and more diverse 
boards, in order to fulfil the needs of stakeholders. 
At the same time, these larger and more diverse 
boards can provide access to more resources and 
increase their networking ability as the resource 
dependence perspective suggests. Hence, it can be 
argued that as an organisation stays in a stock 
exchange for a longer period, it is more exposed to 
the highly regulated external environment and as 
such it attracts more board directors. 
Moreover, the more the years an organisation 
has been “listed”, the more it complies with policies 
and legal requirements. For instance, regulatory 
reforms (Cadbury report, 1992) encourage quoted 
firms to separate the CEO and Chairpersons’ 
Positions and to employ a minimum number of non-
executive directors.  
Boone et al. (2007) and Mikkelson et al. (1997), 
who named the years since the IPO as firm age, 
found that the number of directors steadily 
increases after the IPO for at least 10 years, while 
studies from authors (Denis & Sarin, 1999; Gkliatis 
et al., 2009) that also included older listed firms in 
their samples, strengthen the view that the board 
size continues to increase after those 10 years. 
Increase in board size is positively associated with 
the independence of the board, as usually 
companies that tend to employ more directors, they 
seek for outside directors, which will improve the 
monitoring function of the board and also bring the 
needed resources to the increased requirements of 
the firm. So, based on these arguments it is assumed 
that bigger boards, will also give more emphasis to 
the separation in the board leadership roles and to 
the appointment of an independent Chairperson. 
Therefore, the following propositions are 
developed: 
Proposition 3a: the numbers of years that a firm 
is listed are positively related with the size of the 
board. 
Proposition 3b: the more the years the company 
is listed, the more likely is to employ separate CEO 
and Chairperson Positions. 
Proposition 3c: the more the years the company 
is listed, the more likely is to have independent CEOs 
and Chairperson. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. Sampling  
 
It was decided to use publicly listed firms for the 
study since they are required to disclose information 
of the board of directors and to publish annual 
reports and financial statements (Phan, Lee & Lau, 
2003). All the 140 publicly listed manufacturing 
firms were drawn from the ATHEX – the official 
shares trading market in Greece1 – operating in the 
following sectors: food products-beverages; textiles, 
wearing apparel, footwear; rubber-plastic products, 
non-metallic mineral products; basic metals and 
metal; machinery and equipment; and motor 
vehicles and other transport equipment. The ATHEX 
is the official shares trading market in Greece; it 
provides information on firms that are traded 
(ATHEX, 2001).  
 
3.2. Measurements  
 
The independent variables that were analysed are: 
organisational age, organisational size, and the 
number of years that a firm has been listed in the 
Athens Stock Exchange. The dependent variables are: 
board size, CEO duality and CEO 
dependence/independence. 
Organisational Age was available from the 
Athens Stock Exchange and was defined as the 
number of years elapsed since an organisation was 
incorporated, while the size of the organisation was 
operationalised by the total number of employees 
employed by the organisation. The number of the 
years that the company is listed was gauged by 
calculating the number of years elapsed since the 
company listed in the ASE.  
Board size was measured by counting the 
absolute number of directors that are listed in the 
company’s annual report. For the purpose of 
analysing CEO duality a binary variable was used 
coded “1” for those employing the joint structure 
and “2” for those firms employing the separate 
board structure. However, CEO-Chairperson 
dependence/independence was measured by using 
three values: “1” for CEO duality, “2” for CEO 
/Chairperson separate but affiliated (CEO-Chairman 
dependence) and “3” for CEO/Chairman separate 
and independent (CEO unrelated to Chairperson). 
 
4. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
Descriptive statistics were used to portray the data 
and correlation analysis to explore the 
interrelationships between organisational and board 
characteristics. The study aimed at providing both 
an account of the corporate governance practices in 
Greece and testing a number of propositions. Thus, 
the first descriptive results will be presented 
followed by proposition testing through correlation 
analysis. 
Organisational Age: The empirical findings of 
our study demonstrate that on average the 140 
Greek manufacturing organisations were 
approximately 34 years old; while, most of the 
organisations (46%) were 21-40 years old and 26% 
were between 1-20 years old (Figure 2). In a similar 
                                                          
1 www.ase.gr/content/en/companies/ListedCo/profiles 
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study of family and professionally managed firms, 
Daily and Dollinger (1992) found that the average 
organisational age was 42 years in a total of 67 firms 
which consisted of 43 publicly traded and 24 
privately traded. For the privately traded companies, 
the average was 10.4 years (Boeker & Goodstein, 
1993). In addition, the average firm age of 104 
manufacturing Australian firms was 43.4 and of 169 
Japanese manufacturing firms was 63.7 (Bonn, 
Yoshikawa & Phan, 2004). According to the surveys 
of the Hellenic Observatory of Corporate Governance 
(HOCG, 2008; 2009), 45.4% of the listed companies 
were established from 1971 to 1989, while 29% were 
established before 1971 and 26% from 1990 to 2007.  
 
Figure 2. Organisational age (N=140, x =33.7, median=28.0, SD=21.5) 
 
 
 
Organisational Size: As it can be seen from 
Figure 3 the minimum number of staff employed by 
Greek manufacturing firms is 15, the maximum is 
3350 and the average is approximately 400. 
According to the studies of the HOCG (2007; 2008; 
2009), Greek listed companies had on average 730 
employees during the years 2006 and 2007. In 
similar studies, it was found that the average firm 
size of 486 small manufacturing firms was 78.8 
(Daily & Dollinger, 1992) and of 446 listed Danish 
firms was 3273 employees (Rose, 2005). The 
organisational size of the majority (25.6%) of 242 
manufacturing firms was ranging between 200-499 
employees (Michie & Sheehan-Quinn, 2001).  
 
Figure 3. Organisational size (N=138, x =399.25, median=250.00, SD=467.42) 
 
 
 
Listed in the ASE: Figure 4 indicates that the 
average number of years listed in the ASE was 12; 
however, the majority (85%) of Greek firms were 
listed the last twenty years on Athens Stock 
Exchange and while 9% of them have been listed for 
21 to 40 years. Notably, 2 companies have been 
listed approximately 90 years ago. HOCG (2007; 
2008; 2009) clarified Greek listed companies into 3 
categories regarding the years that they were listed 
in the ATHEX; the first category was “veterans” 
(companies that went public before 1979), the 
second was “mature” (companies that went public 
between 1980 and 1999) while the third was 
“neophytes” (companies that went public from 2000 
up to 2006). According to that survey, 49% of the 
companies were mature (1980-1999) while 37% were 
neophytes (2000-2007) and 15% were veterans 
(before 1970).  
 
Figure 4. Number of years listed in the ATHEX (N=140, x =12.14 SD=5.90) 
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Board Size: As it can be seen in Figure 5, the 
average board size consisted of 7 directors; the 
majority of Greek companies have boards consisting 
of either 5 (30%) or 7 (25%) directors respectively. 
These findings agree with studies that found that 
the average board size in Greece is seven directors 
(Florou & Galarniotis, 2007; Koufopoulos et al., 
2008a; Koufopoulos et al., 2008b; HOCG, 2007; 
2008; 2009; Grant Thornton, 2006; 2007; 2008).  
However, studies from other countries reveal 
quite diverse results. The average board size of 69 
US manufacturing companies was 13.2 (Pearce & 
Zahra, 1991), while the average board size of 104 
Australian manufacturing listed companies was 7.3 
and of 169 Japanese manufacturing listed firms was 
27.6 (Bonn et al., 2004). It is interesting to notice 
that the average board size of Greek manufacturing 
firms is much less than in the US and Japan 
manufacturing firms. 
 
Figure 5. Board size (N= 140, x = 6.95, median=7.00, SD=2.16) 
 
 
 
CEO Duality: Upon examining the data, there is 
a balance between firms that have chosen the 
separation of the CEOs and Chairperson positions 
and those that have not. Particularly, 72 firms 
(51.4%) have adopted the “duality” approach, while 
68 firms (48.6%) have adopted the “separate” 
approach; two individuals fulfil the positions of CEO 
and Chairperson respectively. This finding is similar 
to Grant Thornton’s (2005; 2006; 2007) surveys, that 
found that in less than 50% of companies the 
Chairperson and CEO are different individuals 
without family ties.  
On the other hand, other studies investigated 
that the majority of Greek listed companies split the 
roles of Chairperson and CEO. Florou and 
Galarniotis (2007) collected data from 274 listed 
companies in 2003 and argue that the majority of 
companies (53%) separate these roles. Similarly, 
Tsipouri and Xanthakis (2004) claim that 53% of 
companies have separate individuals on these roles.  
Empirical studies conducted in the United 
States (Baliga & Moyer, 1996), in Europe (O’Sullivan & 
Wong, 1998; Dedman, 2000) and in Singapore (Wan 
& Ong, 2005) have shown that manufacturing firms 
tend to rely on a “separate” leadership structure 
model. 
CEO Dependence/Independence: Figure 6 
indicates that of the manufacturing companies that 
employ a “separate leadership” structure (48%) – half 
are somewhat affiliated; being either family 
members or former business associates. The rest are 
independent from the CEO. In other studies (HOCG, 
2007; 2008; 2009) it was found that a high 
proportion of Chairpersons and CEOs (15%) have the 
same surname, and due to that, it was argued that 
only 42% of boards have a separated and 
independent (without CEO-Chairperson family ties) 
board structure.  
Other studies revealed that only 24 % of quoted 
UK firms have independent boards (Weir & Laing, 
2001) and in 20% of U.S quoted corporations 
chairpersons were somehow related with the CEO 
and only 12% of these firms, had a joint 
CEO/Chairperson structure (Daily & Dalton, 1997).  
 
Figure 6. CEO dependence/independence (N=140) 
 
Proposition Testing: Table 1 presents the 
correlation matrix showing the relationships 
between organisational demographic characteristics 
and board structure characteristics. 
The first proposition aimed at investigating 
examining the relationship between organisational 
age and board size and structure. The results 
showed that the older the organisation is, the bigger 
the size of the board becomes, which is translated as 
a positive relation of the two variables. Nevertheless, 
there wasn’t found a relationship between the 
organisational age and the leadership structure or 
the dependency/independence of the chairperson to 
the CEO. The second proposition suggests a 
significant positive relationship between 
organisational size and board size. The results 
indicate that as the size of the firm increases the 
board size increases as well. However, no significant 
association between organisational size and 
leadership structure was found. Furthermore, no 
statistically significant relation was detected 
between organisational size and chairperson 
independence. Finally, the third proposition implies 
that the number of years that a firm is listed in the 
Stock Exchange can be positively correlated with 
board size, while there was no significant effect of 
the years that a firm is listed in the Stock Exchange 
on the leadership structure and the independence of 
the Chairperson. 
Moreover, ANOVA test was employed to 
examine the difference in means of groups of 
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organisational characteristics in terms of board size 
(Table 2). From the findings, it is evident that there 
is a significant difference in the means of board size 
for companies that differ in age, size and the 
number of years that have been listed in the stock 
exchange. The test further supports the proposition 
that board size is affected by these organisational 
characteristics.  
 
Table 1. Correlation matrix for organisation characteristics and board characteristics 
 
 Board Size CEO Duality Chairperson Independence 
Organisational Age ,215(**) -,034 -,055 
Organisational Size ,434(**) -,094 -,062 
Year of entering the ATHEX ,255(**) -,028 -,020 
Note:  ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
CEO Duality: “1” for joint leadership structure, “2” for separate leadership structure. 
CEO/Chairman dependence/independence: “1” for CEO duality, “2” for CEO/Chairman separate but affiliated, “3” for 
CEO/Chairman separate and independent. 
Number of Years listed in the Athens Stock Exchange: “1” for 1-20, “2” for 21-40, “3” for 41-60, “4” for 61-80, “5” for 81-
100, “6” for 101-120, “7” for 121-140, “8” for 141 or more. 
 
Table 2. ANOVA results 
 
Independent 
Dependent: Board Size 
Mean F 
Organisational Size 
A. up to 50 6.25(n=71) 
10.648*** B. 51 to 250 7.32(n=38) 
C. 251 to 500 8.24(n=29) 
Organisational Age (years) 
A. 1-20 6.39(n=36) 
2.050* 
B. 21-40 6.84(n=64) 
C. 41-60 7.08(n=13) 
D. 61-80 7.55(n=20) 
E. 81-100 8.60(n=5) 
F. 101-120 9.50(n=2) 
Year listed in the ATHEX 
A. up to 20 7.56(n=119) 
3.056** 
B. 21-40 7.41(n=12) 
C. 41-60 7.26(n=3) 
D. 61-80 7.26(n=4) 
E. 81-100 7.26(n=2) 
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION  
 
Numerous corporate collapses and scandals have 
spurred recent changes, and boards are required to 
take a more active role in monitoring, evaluating and 
improving their own performance, the CEO’s 
performance and subsequently the firm’s 
performance. This study aimed to examine the 
effects of organisational characteristics on board 
attributes based on a sample of Greek 
manufacturing firms.  
In particular, this study found that the majority 
of Greek manufacturing firms have on average 400 
employees. A great portion of Greek manufacturing 
firms has been incorporated in the last forty years, 
specifically 92% (129), whereas a great proportion of 
those, which is 85% (119), have been listed in the 
ASE since the 1980. In addition, it was found that a 
big segment of Greek companies (30%), have an 
average board size of seven members. It also 
appears to be a balance between firms that have 
chosen the separation of the CEOs and Chairperson 
Positions and those that have not. More specifically, 
51.4% of Greek firms have adopted CEO duality, 
while 48.6% tend to choose separate Chairperson 
and CEO. A closer look at the above reveals that on 
those instances that a separate structure exists, an 
affiliation between the two key organisational 
decision makers appears. Organisational 
characteristics, such as organisational age, 
organisational size, and the number of years listed 
in the Athens Stock Exchange, were examined with 
respect to board structure components (board size, 
CEO duality, CEO dependence/independence). The 
results have revealed positive and significant 
associations between all three organisational 
characteristics (size, age and years that a company is 
listed in the ATHEX) and board size, but not with the 
CEO Duality or the CEO dependence/independence.  
The findings and the implications of this 
research should be considered in light of its 
limitations. First, data from one year only was used. 
Generalisability of the findings would have enhanced 
if we had used data in time series of three or five or 
more consecutive years. During the period of data 
collection, the activities of the Greek listed 
companies might have been influenced by external 
factors (e.g., economic recession). Second, the 
sample composed of a cross-section of firms of 
different sizes, ages, and operating in one sector 
(manufacturing), which couldn’t provide a holistic 
insight regarding the corporate governance practices 
and for all Greek listed and non-listed firms. 
Future research can examine the relationship 
between board characteristics with financial 
performance measures. Furthermore, a more 
detailed examination of organisational 
characteristics could give us more useful insights 
into the relationships with board characteristics. 
One example would be to explore how the board size 
depends on the number of sectors in which a 
company operates. In addition, an interesting avenue 
of research could be the differences that well-
performing versus poor performing firms may 
exhibit in relation to board elements. Moreover, 
there is a need to continue the cross-country 
comparative approach examining the effectiveness 
of the governance role played by the boards in 
different national contexts: Balkan and Southeast 
European, Mediterranean and Middle East countries. 
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Further research in the area of corporate governance 
will provide researchers with additional elements 
and factors that may influence this increasingly 
interesting and important scientific domain in the 
years to come. 
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